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TORT IMMUNITY DOCTRINE IN MISSOURI
INTRODUCTION
The author of the statement, "The King can do no wrong," would be amazed
by the tortious and complex meanderings which courts have taken in predicating
municipal tort immunity in the Twentieth Century upon a guide relevant to
Twelfth Century needs. This aphorism, that the King can do no wrong, is not ques-
tioned as to its inception, but rather in how it came to be affixed and upheld in
modern day municipal corporations law.
The sovereignty of the King was eventually transferred to Parliament, and
then to the subdivisions acting for Parliament, the State; and the municipality as
a participant and sharer in this sovereign character also took upon itself to
adopt the sovereign cloak protecting it from suit, as it did the King. With the
sovereignty concept as a foundation, Russel v. Me-n Residing in the County of
Devonx became the principal case establishing municipal non-liability in torts.
In England at the time of Russel, there was no concept of local corporate
autonomy and legal recoveries were not allowed against such nonexistent bodies
but rather against the individual inhabitants of a particular area. Therefore, in
the repair or disrepair of bridges and roads, the inhabitants themselves were held
responsible by fines against their lands or by personal services. The county, as such,
became charged with this obligation only when some definite obligation on an
individual or his land could not be otherwise established. The plaintiffs in the
Russel decision brought an action on the case to recover for an injury to their
wagon caused by the disrepair of a bridge. Two of the inhabitants of the county,
answering for defendant county, demurred generally for themselves and the rest
of the inhabitants.
Lord Kenyon, the judge deciding the action, was confronted with a govern-
mental entity practically nonexistent according to our present day definition of
a municipality. It was called a county but unincorporated and without funds. In
sustaining the defendant's demurrer, Lord Kenyon expressed the following reasons
for go doing: (1) if this case were allowed, an infinity of actions would result; (2)
an action would lie against a single individual who was bound to keep the bridge
in repair; (3) it would be an injustice to those who came into the county sub-
sequent to the injury; and (4) if the county were to be regarded as a corporation,
there was no corporate fund from which payment of a judgment might be made.
1. 2 Term Rep. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1778).
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Therefore, when the courts of this country were confronted with a problem
of similar circumstances but affecting towns which were incorporated and with
funds, they applied the doctrine of non-liability to American towns which Lord
Kenyon had applied to the unincorporated county in the Russel case.2 This was
dearly a misapplication of the precedent established in the Russel decision; however,
this doctrine, with its many variations, inconsistencies, and exceptions in applica-
tion, has been widely accepted and has become "the American doctrine" of
municipal tort immunity. The fallacy of this doctrine as applied to this country's
municipalities is in the fact that incorporation of the governmental subdivision
has remedied the lack of a party defendant. Duties may now be imposed upon
our towns and counties for the benefit of the individual. The modern day taxing
power provides the means both of performing functions for the citizen and of
compensating for injuries through payments of damages to the injured. Insurance
carried by the modern municipality is commonplace today even though carried
without legal compulsion because of its immunity; its acquisition is due to the
growing moral responsibility of the municipality toward its injured citizens.3 Every
logical reason for rejection of the immunity doctrine to the municipal corporation
has been argued before the courts; however the bulk of American tribunals continue
to cling to the precedent established in Russel, as misapplied in this country. Con-
sequently, when the injured plaintiff seeks compensation he must sue an all too
often execution-proof municipal employee who was negligently performing his
duties on behalf of the city; this in most instances is no recovery at all.
The early cases in Missouri's municipal tort history, as well as the recent
2. The court stated in Riddle v. Proprietors of Locks & Canals, 7 Mass. 169,
187 (1810):
We distinguish between proper aggregate corporations, and the in-
habitants of any district, who are by statute invested with particular
powers without their consent. These are in the books some times called
quasi corporations. Of this description are counties and hundreds, in Eng-
land; and counties, towns & c., in this state.
In Mower v. Inhabitants of Leicester, 9 Mass. 247, 250 (1812), the court remarked:
The plaintiff has brought his action against the inhabitants of the town
of Leicester, for the loss of his horse, occasioned by the neglect of that
town to keep a certain bridge in repair... . But it is well settled that the
common law gives no such action.
See also, Hooe v. Alexandria, 12 Fed. Cas. 461 (No. 6666) (C.C.D.C. 1802).
3. The effect of liability insurance upon the immunity of a municipality is
an area which itself is beset with difficulties. The basic problem is this: even though
coverage exists, an insurance company is not normally liable unless the insured is
in fact liable for the claim which is made. Under this principle the fact of insurance
would do nothing; it would simply be a useless public expenditure. However, the
authorities in many areas have allowed the fact of insurance, where there is a
covenant on the part of the insurance company not to use the immunity defense,
to subject the city to liability. This area is beyond the scope of this comment, but
it is mentioned for the purpose of showing that the existence of insurance coverage
does not necessarily end the injustices caused by the immunity doctrine. For an
excellent discussion of this matter see Gibbons, Liability Insurance and the Tort
Immunity of State and Local Government, 1959 DUKE L.J. 588. See also, Annot.,
68 A.L.R.2d 1437 (1959).
1962]
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cases of Dallas v. City of St. Louis4 and Gillen v. City of St. Louis,5 have applied
(or have misapplied) the precedent long ago established in the Russel decision.
The Missouri Supreme Court in both Dallas and Gillen adhered to the "govern-
mental-proprietary" dichotomy of municipal functionse which has been declared
by many eminent scholars and judges to be without any rational basis, if not the
product of palpable error.7
The Dallas case permitted plaintiff to recover for the wrongful death of her
husband, which resulted while he was servicing a city garbage and refuse truck.
The court classified the operation of a city garage for maintenance and repair of
its motor vehicles as proprietary. As the question of negligence wasn't in issue
upon appeal, the court based liability solely upon the fact that the function per-
formed was proprietary and not governmental, in which latter case immunity
would have been granted.8 This fictional classification of a city's acts interjects
another inconsistency into an area where inconsistencies seem to abound.
Using a similar approach, the court in Gillen denied recovery for serious and
permanent injuries resulting from a traffic sign falling and striking the plaintiff
while he was lawfully using the public sidewalk. In rejecting plaintiff's claim of
general negligence under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine the court stated:
We think the petition shows upon its face that the alleged negligent acts
complained of in the construction, maintenance and control of the men-
tioned traffic sign were committed in the performance of a governmental
function for which the City is not liable in tort.9
4. 338 S.W.2d 39 (Mo. 1960).
5. 345 S.W.2d 69 (Mo. 1961).
6. "The common-law distinction that, with whatever exceptions, now renders
municipal corporations of almost all the American states immune from tort liability
in the performance of one class of functions-'public,' 'sovereign,' 'state,' 'govern-
mental,' 'political'--but not in the other--'private,' 'corporate,' 'proprietary,' 'Coin-
mercial'--seems to the 'plain man' to be due to the 'perverse ingenuity' of thejudicial mind." Barnett, The Foundations of the Distinction Between Public and
Private Functions in Respect to the Common-Law Tort Liability of Municipal
Corporations, 16 ORE. L. REv. 250 (1937).
7. Annot., 120 A.L.R. 1376, 1378 (1936); Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 1193, 1198
(1958); Barnett, op. cit. supra note 6; Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34
YALE L.J. 1 (1934); Freedman, Liability in Tort of Municipal Corporations in
Missouri, 3 Mo. L. REv. 275 (1938); Green, Municipal Liability for Torts, 38 ILL.
L. Rav. 355 (1944); Harno, Tort Immunity of Municipal Corporations, 4 ILL.
L.Q. 28 (1921); Repko, American Legal Commentary on the Doctrines of Mwnici-
pal Tort Liability, 9 LAW & CoNThmF. PROB. 214 (1942).
8. The reason for this classification was amply expressed in Healy v. Kansas
City, 277 Mo. 619, 626, 211 S.W. 59, 60 (1919); the court stated:
Municipal corporations are considered in two aspects. One where their
functions relate to the corporate interests only, and the other where they
discharge certain governmental functions. The authority for the latter is
characterized as "quasi-delegated sovereignty for the preservation of the
public peace and safety and the prevention of crime." In performing the
duties relating solely to its corporate character the city is liable for in-juries caused by negligence of its agents; in performing duties relative to
the latter or governmental character for the public good, it is not liable.
9. Gillen v. City of St. Louis, supra note 5, at 73.
[Vol. 27
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In tacitly affirming the city's negligence, the court deferred the plaintiff's claim
to a far distant time when the legislature might take the matter under their ambit.
With the early English development and the Missouri Supreme Court's re-
cent treatment of the subject before us, it is the purpose of this comment to delve
into the inequities and the injustices to which the municipal immunity doctrine
has subjected the injured plaintiff in Missouri. This criticism is aimed at the non-
liability for a municipality's "governmental" torts; it does not challenge the
prerogative of a governmental unit to establish or decide what services shall be
provided. However, once this prerogative has been exercised, and the undertaking
begun, it is asserted that the immunity doctrine has no place in the law today.
The ingrained philosophy of immunity from governmental tort is a vivid illustra-
tion of how strict adherence to precedent and judicial unresponsiveness toward
injustices fails to serve the crying needs of the injured plaintiff in our modem
society.
With these considerations in mind, an examination will be made of the areas
in which the courts have allowed municipalities to escape liability for acts which
would be actionable if committed by an individual or his agent.
I. FIRE DEPARTMENTS IN MISSOURI
Missouri joins the great majority of states in upholding governmental immu-
nity for the operation and maintenance of fire departments. The relatively few
cases on this subject indicate the depth of entrenchment that the immunity doctrine
possesses.
Heller v. Sedalia,'° was the first Missouri case involving a city's liability for
the operation of its fire department. The court had to decide whether the alleged
negligence of firemen should make the city liable for the loss of a valuable brewery.
In setting forth what was to become the general rule in Missouri, the court said:
It was not the intention of the Legislature, in conferring power on
the city to establish a fire department, to render it responsible as an
insurer for losses by fire. The power conferred was a legislative or dis-
cretionary power, which the city authorities might in their wisdom exercise
or not. The creation of the fire department was not for the peculiar
benefit of the corporation, but for the public. And the officers of this de-
partment, although appointed by the city, are public officers, and not
agents of the city in the sense that renders the city liable for their acts
or omissions of duty."1
The court did not even attempt to examine the question of negligence, but rather
entered upon the discussion of immunity of fire departments.
This type of reasoning was further established as a precedent in McKenna
v. City of St. Louis.1 2 This was an action for the death of a nine year old boy
who, while lawfully standing on the sidewalk, was run over by the wheel of one
of the fire department's hose carriages due to the alleged careless, reckless and
10. 53 Mo. 159 (1873).
11. Id. at 161.
12. 6 Mo. App. 320 (St. L. Ct. App. 1878).
1962]
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unskillful driving of the carriage by a city employee. The court recited the ritualized
argument of governmental immunity and the non-responsibility for such negligence
in the performance of matters of public concern. The plaintiff was not contesting
the inherent authority of the city to establish a fire department, but rather the
negligent operation of that department once established. In effect the court said
that the taking of the life of a nine year old boy without compensation was a
necessary consequence of the operation of the city's fire department.
In a similar vein, it has been held that the erection of a fire house in a residen-
tial district, when it could be built in a business district only a few blocks away,
does not constitute an enjoinable nuisance to property owners even though such
construction results in a devaluation of nearby land.' 3
In Hawkins v. City of Springfield,14 plaintiff's property was flooded by a public
sewer; plaintiff sued the city for not using effectively and at the proper time its
fire engine and pump to prevent the overflow. The court held: "The city cannot
be held liable in damages for either a negligent use or failure to use its fire engines
and equipment."ir5 Interestingly enough, the city eventually had to resort to its
fire equipment to rectify the problem, but the court did not feel that this
strengthened plaintiff's case.
The latest case concerning fire department activities, Richardson v. City of
Hannibal,16 again stated the oft repeated opinion that a fire department is immune
from liability even though its motor, hook and ladder truck, while being driven
on the wrong side of the street, collides with and demolishes a parked car. The
conditions of negligence could not be more brazenly presented than here, but the
court remarked:
If conditions so change that public justice demands that the munic-
ipalities shall be responsible for the negligence of the members of the
fire departments, the Legislature has the power to prescribe the remedy
and will probably do so.17
Unfortunately, judicial procrastination still is the byword in this aggrieved field of
the law.
It is of importance to note that it has been twenty-nine years since a case
has reached a Missouri appellate court concerning municipal fire departments. This
absence of litigation can be partially explained by the indefatigable stand which
the courts have taken.
II. PoLicE DEPARTMENTS
It is also established in Missouri and elsewhere in the country that when a
municipal corporation is operating a police department for the preservation of
13. Van De Vere v. Kansas City, 107 Mo. 83, 17 S.W. 695 (1891).
14. 194 Mo. App. 151, 186 S.W. 576 (Spr. Ct. App. 1916). The court stated
that the degree of duty was to use ordinary care and diligence to keep sewers free
from obstruction likely to cause damage thereto.
15. Id. at 155, 186 S.W. at 577.
16. 330 Mo. 398, 50 S.W.2d 648 (1932) (en banc).
17. Id. at 406, 50 S.W.2d at 650.
[Vol. 27
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the peace, the enforcement of the law, and the apprehension of criminals, it is
performing its governmental duties and therefore is immune from tort liability.
There is no argument with cases which grant immunity to police officers for
failure to enforce the law or suppress crime; but when cities escape liability for
wilful, negligent or illegal acts of police officers the inequities noted in the fire
department cases again appear. The courts have continually held that police
officers, though appointed, paid, and discharged by the municipal corporation are
not agents of the municipality but of the state and therefore the general doctrine
of respondeat superior is inapplicable.28
The courts of Missouri have granted immunity from tort in false arrest""
and in so doing established the following doctrine:
When, so acting [as police officers], their duties are of a public char-
acter; their acts are in the interest of civil government and of the public,
and they are not, when acting in that behalf, the servants of the town or
city, in its corporate capacity. The relations of principal and agent do not
then exist, and the town is not liable for their said acts in that behalf.
The bare allegations that said marshal and recorder committed a trespass
upon the person of the plaintiff, though colore offlcii, do not, we think
make, a prima facie case against the municipal corporation, which is not
liable for any and all acts and trespasses of its officers, voluntary, malicious
and unauthorized, and which, prima facie, is not liable for their wrongful
acts.20
This principle of law has been adhered to in subsequent cases, and consequently
the city has not been liable for its officers' continued wrongful threats of repeated
prosecutions upon a person acquitted of a crime. 2' The city has not been liable
in tort for its mayor and police officers tearing and destroying circus property,
arresting the owner of such, and threatening his employees due to the city's
wrongful issuance of a license to exhibit his circus on a site that was formerly a
graveyard. 22
In Ulrick v. City of St. Louis,23 the city was held not liable for the injury
of a prisoner in a police workhouse which resulted from the negligent acts of its
police officers in requiring the prisoner to harness a team of mules that were known
to be vicious and dangerous. The court commented:
In this case, the city of St. Louis was simply in the exercise of its
public, governmental functions delegated to it by the state, from the time
18. Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 241 (1924). As
Borchard points out there are two distinct but related doctrines of immunity, one
dealing with states and the other with municipalities. This comment is limited to
the latter, but it must be noted that the two become closely connected in the area
of local police functions.
19. Worley v. Inhabitant of Columbia, 88 Mo. 106 (1885). See also, Graves v.
City of Bolivar, 154 F. Supp. 625 (W.D. Mo. 1957); McConnel v. City of St.
Charles, 204 S.W. 1075 (Mo. 1918).
20. Worley v. Inhabitants of Columbia, supra note 19, at 109.
21. Butler v. City of Moberly, 131 Mo. App. 172, 110 S.W. 682 (KC. Ct.
App. 1908).
22. City of Kansas City v. Lemen, 57 Fed. 905 (8th Cir. 1893).
23. 112 Mo. 138, 20 S.W. 466 (1892) (en banc).
19621
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the first arrest was made until the injury occurred, in enforcing its or-
dinances enacted to preserve the peace, safety, and good order of society,
and it is no more liable for the negligence of its officers in this respect,
than the state would be liable for the negligence of its highest officers in
the performance of the same class of duties.24
There are many Missouri cases which point up the inequitable consequences
that can result from following the immunity doctrine. In Conneuy v. City of
Sedalia,25 the court granted immunity to the city's police department for not re-
turning a number of tires mistakenly thought to be abandoned because "the city
is not liable for any conversion of the tires of which the police department may
have been guilty."26 If a citizen of Missouri is in jail and is maliciously and
viciously assaulted by a police officer who is known to be brutal, that citizen
cannot claim damages from the city "without opening up unlimited possibilities
for wasteful and dishonest dissipation of public funds."27 Such a judicial attitude
leaves the impression that to tender a tort claim to the city after being wrongfully
and viciously beaten by one of its police officers is a dishonest action on the part
of the one so injured. If a claim be made to the city for the death of a prisoner
as a result of the burning of the city jail, although it was proven to have no
alarms, extinguishers or even a jailor on duty, 28 it will be dismissed. Upholding
immunity in these cases throws a great doubt upon the validity of the general
proposition that "for every wrong there is a remedy."
The courts have even gone so far as to extend immunity of city police depart-
ments to the maintenance of their police stations. In Pearson v. Kansas City, the
city was held not liable to one of its own employees for injuries resulting from a
fall into an elevator shaft due to the defective catching device on its elevator
door.2 However, in the earlier case of Carrington v. City of St. Louis,30 the court
felt that painting and leaving open the cellar door to the police station constituted
an obstruction on the sidewalk and the city was therefore liable for resulting in-
juries. Liability was not assessed upon the basis of negligence in maintenance of
a police station, but upon keeping sidewalks reasonably safe from obstructions.
Strangely enough, the court found the police officer here to be an agent of the
city, and his knowledge of the condition of the doors to constitute notice to the city.
The absolute position the courts have taken in police department tort cases
has not been without the recognition by some of the judges that the rule of law
set forth by early cases has established an unjust precedent. This divergence of
24. Id. at 148-49, 20 S.W. at 469.
25. 222 Mo. App. 109, 2 S.W.2d 632 (K.C. Ct. App. 1928).
26. Id. at 111, 2 S.W.2d at 633.
27. Hinds v. City of Hannibal, 212 S.W.2d 401, 402 (Mo. 1948).
28. Brown v. City of Craig, 350 Mo. 836, 168 S.W.2d 1080 (1943).
29. 331 Mo. 885, 55 S.W.2d 485 (1932).
30. 89 Mo. 208, 1 S.W. 240 (1886); See also, Brown v. City of Marshall, 71
S.W.2d 856 (K.C. Ct. App. 1934), where the death of a small boy resulted from
the creation of a dangerous overhanging ledge in a sand pit by city prisoners.
Liability was partially assessed on the basis of a street commissioner directing the
work and thus giving notice to the city of the dangerous conditions.
[VoL 27
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opinion has not constituted a trend of insurgency, but it is interesting to note
that sprinkled throughout the Missouri litigation on this subject, there is an
indication of some liberalism on the part of the courts. For example, in the Car-
rington case the court declared that "while these officers are state officers for some
purposes they are also city officers." 32 This statement is contrary to the theory
that police officers are purely functionaries of the state with no allegiance to the
city. In Stater v. City of Joplin,32 which was a case involving a police vehicle,
the court, after reciting the usual argument of governmental immunity, went on
to comment:
It must be admitted that there is strong reason for holding that
where a city has exercised the governmental power of determining the
kind and character of fire and police apparatus to be used by it, it is
then acting within its delegated powers for the "greater public," and
that officers, in performing their duties in this connection are public
officers for whose negligence the city is not required to respond; but that
when the city has exercised this governmental function of determining the
general character of the apparatus, the keeping of that apparatus in proper
repair becomes ministerial. However, this is not in accord with the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals' decisions in this State, nor with the gen-
eral weight of authority.33 (Emphasis added.)
The complexities of modem municipal government necessitate the relaxing
of the present rules of non-liability. But the unwillingness of the courts to rectify
the situation of municipal tort claims is not due to non-recognition of these com-
plexities. Rather, it is the general feeling of the courts that the regulations and
limitations so imposed should originate with the legislature. In the relatively recent
case of Hinds v. City of Hannibal, the court made clear where a change must
originate:
Any change in this situation must be made by the Legislature, as has
been done in providing for tort claims against other states and the Federal
Government, because only the Legislature could prescribe all regulations
and limitations necessary to protect the public interest and provide the
fiscal basis for payment of such claims-
III. TAraFic DrEcrTioN
In upholding the principle of governmental immunity in regard to the city's
traffic lights, signals and street warnings, two different lines of authority appear
from the Missouri cases. On the one hand, the courts have reasoned that the city
is responsible for injuries resulting from any defects or obstructions upon its public
31. Carrington v. City of St. Louis, supra note 30, at 215, 1 S.W. at 241.
32. 189 Mo. App. 383, 176 S.W. 241 (Spr. Ct. App. 1915). A police officer was
driving an automobile that was known to be out of order, worn and defective, and
due to said mechanical condition, plus the careless and reckless manner of driving,
resulted in crippling injuries to an innocent party sitting in a buggy.
33. Id. at 389, 176 S.W. at 242-43.
34. 212 S.W.2d 401, 402 (Mo. 1948). See also, Brown v. City of Craig, supra
note 28, at 1083.
19621
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streets. This responsibility stems from the city's corporate duties to keep its streets
reasonably safe and in suitable condition. On the other hand, the actual regulation
of traffic on Missouri streets is a governmental function having its rudimentary
basis as follows:
Formerly traffic in a city was directed and regulated solely by the
police departments. But the advent of paved roads and the motor have
so increased travel and the speed of vehicles that it is necessary to regulate
traffic at almost all of the street intersections in a city. It is beyond the
power of the police department to do so through the limited personnel
of the department. In this situation efforts have been made to substitute
for the policeman a signal or sign device as a means of regulation.35
The justification of the traffic sign is not in dispute. But, in those instances when
the sign is defective in the manner of installation, maintenance or when it con-
stitutes an obstruction to traffic, it is contended that the rules of immunity should
not apply.
The first case in which the court encountered the problem of traffic regulations
or traffic control in general, was Cavanaugh v. Gerk.36 Although the case concerned
a writ of habeas corpus brought by a traffic violator, in viewing the case the court
commented:
As a police regulation, the city could provide for the safety and conven-
ience of its inhabitants, by ordinance, define the parking places, establish
automatic signals and one-way streets, and other regulation .... 
Such language plus the city's inherent police powers, firmly established automatic
traffic signals within the category of the municipality's governmental functions.
The injustice of characterizing all functioning of traffic control devices as gov-
ernmental was illustrated in Blackburn v. City of St. Louis, s when an automobile
after careening off a metal safety zone button outlining a safety zone struck an
innocent person standing approximately fifteen feet back from the street on the
sidewalk. The court felt the maintenance of the buttons, which were proven to be
discolored, unlighted, unpainted and partially sunk into the street, was a govern-
mental function and therefore the city was immune. The plaintiff's contention
that maintenance of the safety-zone buttons was a violation of the non-delegable
duty of the city to keep its streets in a reasonably safe condition was rejected
by the court. The inconsistency of the court's standard was shown by a later hold-
ing in Mengel v. City of St. Louis,"9 that an unguarded and unlighted concrete
35. Prewitt v. City of St. Joseph, 70 S.W.2d 916, 917 (Mo. 1934).
36. 313 Mo. 375, 280 S.W. 51 (1926) (en banc).
37. Id. at 380, 280 S.W. at 52.
38. 343 Mo. 301, 121 S.W.2d 727 (1928). See also, Hiltener v. Kansas City,
293 S.W.2d 422 (Mo. 1956), where the city was likewise immune from an action
for personal injuries for its negligent maintenance of a vertical post and reflector
sign used to define and warn of an existing safety zone.
39. 341 Mg. 994, 111 S.W.2d 5 (1937). See also, Mertz v. Kansas City, 229
Mo. App. 402, 81 S.W.2d 462 (K.C. Ct. App. 1935), where the city was held liable
for maintenance of a street island, which had some effect on traffic regulation.
9
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slab which was formerly used to support a traffic device, constituted an obstruction
and breach of the city's corporate duty.
The negligent failure to maintain an automatic stop and go signal at a busy
street intersection has been adjudged to be a governmental function of the city.40
This was decided irrespective of the fact that the malfunctioning was reported
to the city five hours prior to the plaintiff's accident, plus the fact that the city
did not even put up an out-of-order sign after receiving notice.
The courts have similarly failed to impute negligence to the city in regulating
or failing to regulate traffic, stating that such function was an exercise of govern-
mental powers. 41 In Gillen v. City of St. Louis,4 2 which is the Missouri Supreme
Court's most recent declaration in this area, the court again bowed to precedent
and left the injured plaintiff to seek his remedy against the negligent employee,
if one could be discovered.
IV. HOSPITALS
The establishment and maintenance of a municipal hospital, while in the
process of preservation and safeguarding the public health, is usually considered
to be a governmental function and therefore the immunity theory follows.
The Supreme Court of Missouri first dealt with the municipal torts of hos-
pitals in 1869. The court upheld the immunity of the city against a claim by a
nonpaying patient in the city hospital for injuries received as a result of the
negligence and misconduct of the officers of the hospital, and the following rule
was set forth:
The general result of these adjudications seems to be this: where the
officer or servant of a municipal corporation is in the exercise of a power
conferred upon the corporation for its private benefit, and injury ensues
from negligence or misfeasance of such officer or servant, the corporation
is liable, as in the case of private corporations or parties; but when the
acts or omissions complained of were done or omitted in the exercise of a
corporate franchise conferred upon the corporation for the public good,
and not for private corporate advantage, then the corporation is not
liable for the consequences of such acts or omissions on the part of its
officers and servants.4
Using the Murtaugk case as a standard, along with the traditional rule that
the health officers are officers of the State, the court in Zum/mo v. Kansas City
held that "the same exemption enjoyed by the State itself from liability for
damages inflicted by its officers and agents in the performance of similar duties
attaches to the defendant city."- Thus, by using this "arm of the State govern-
ment" theory, there was no liability on the part of the city for negligently putting
40. Auslander v. City of St. Louis, 332 Mo. 145, 56 S.W.2d 778 (1938) (en
banc).
41. Caruthers v. City of St. Louis, 341 Mo. 1073, 111 S.W.2d 32 (1937).
42. 345 S.W.2d 69 (Mo. 1961).
43. Murtaugh v. City of St. Louis, 44 Mo. 479, 480 (1869).
44. 285 Mo. 222, 231, 225 S.W. 934, 936 (1920).
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plaintiff's husband into a room occupied by a person known to be violent, who
during the night strangled and murdered plaintiff's husband.
Both the Murtaug. and Zuimmo cases involved nonpaying patients, which sup-
ported the city's contention of pure governmental operations from which it derives
no financial benefits. However, in Schroeder v. City of St. Louis,.5 the court dis-
regarded the pecuniary profit involved and remarked:
The fact that a patient is a charity case or a paying patient has no mate-
rial bearing on the merits of the case. If in operating a hospital, a city
is performing a governmental function, there is no liability in tort actions.4"
If a hospital in accepting payments is still to be classified as performing a
governmental function, then the same reasoning should be applied to the city's
water and light plants. These departments would seem to be as essential to main-
tenance of the governmental functions of a municipal corporation as a hospital, and
yet death resulting from negligence in one of the latter departments is condemned.
Such injustice perpetuated by the immunity of the city applies not only to
the innocent citizen but to the city's own employees. In Watrous v. City of St.
Louir, as a result of unsafe conditions negligently permitted by the city, an em-
ployee in a city hospital fell into the hospital incinerator and was injured.4 7 In
granting governmental immunity, the court stated:
The principal reason for the rule of municipal immunity is that the
general rules of respondeat superior cannot be applied to public officers
without opening up unlimited possibilities for wasteful and dishonest dis-
sipation of public funds. ... That reason applies to claims by municipal
employees with as much force and logic as it applies to claims by mem-
bers of the general public4
It has been suggested that a fear of tort liability by the officers of a hospital
might place them in a state of overcautiousness; the answer to this is that such
officers are themselves now subject to suit, a change would only add another
potential defendant. That the municipal corporation employs, compensates and
discharges agents who commit negligent acts in itself obligates the municipal
corporation to make an adjustment to the injured party rather than to pass the
burden to their employees, acting under competent authority but in a negligent
manner.
V. STREET CLEANING, GARBAGE AND REFUSE COLLECTION
The general rule is that the removal of dirt, garbage and refuse from the city
streets and residences is classified as being a governmental function which pro-
motes the public health and comfort and the municipality is therefore not liable
for the negligent acts committed while engaged in these functions.49 However,
45. 360 Mo. 293, 228 S.W. 677 (1950).
46. Id. at 296, 228 S.W.2d at 679.
47. 281 S.W.2d 594 (St. L. Ct. App. 1955).
48. Id. at 596.
49. RnYNE, MUNICIPAL LAw 774 (1957).
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some of the states have held to the contrary on the ground that this is a corporate
function and the benefit to the public health a mere incident. The Missouri courts
regarded the functions of street cleaning, garbage and refuse collection as
proprietary until 1912, when the supreme court adopted the governmental classifi-
cation. In certain instances obstructions created as a result of the street cleaning
operations have been declared to be within the city's proprietary capacity, on the
ground that it is the duty of the city to keep its streets and sidewalks in a safe
condition for travel.
The most noteworthy stand taken against governmental immunity in general,
and street cleaning in particular, was handed down in 1907 by Judge Ellison in
Young v. Metropolitan St. Ry. 50 After conceding the fact that municipalities in
Missouri have -been granted immunity in other functions and that the great
weight of authority throughout the country classifies street cleaning as a govern-
mental function, the judge remarked that "in our opinion the better rule is that a
city is liable for the negligence of its servants in cleaning its streets."5r In this
case the city was involved in a collision between a street railway car and a street
cleaning vehicle which was at the time removing dirt and rubbish from the street.
The court decided the case on the basis that the removal was concurrent with the
duty to keep the streets safe for travel, and in adopting this argument the court
threw out the "public health" concept as it applied to street cleaning functions.
The court noted that:
The fact that cleaning streets is conducive to public health is a mere
incident and does not affect the question. Sewers are always, and properly
repaired streets are frequently, conducive to the health of congested pop-
ulations, yet that does not prevent the application or ordinary rules of
liability for negligence as applied to either.52
The court continued, in its opinion, contesting the very basis of the governmental
immunity doctrine:
The reasons given for liability and for non-liability of municipal cor-
porations we admit are not logical or consistent. Some of the reasons given
for non-liability will apply just as forcibly to cases where liability is as-
serted and vice versa ...
But, even in determining the general question, the fact that the act
may be helpful to the general health, or may, in some remote degree, be
referable to governmental regulation, ought not to control. . . . "In al-
most all affairs of purely local concern some indirect relation may be traced
to a matter of health, safety, or other subject of governmental cogni-
zance. .. "53
The position taken in this case is to be highly commended as it not only satis-
fied the needs of the injured claimant, but it satisfies the needs of the general
public as well. It is unfortunate that this recognition of the artificiality and un-
50. 126 Mo. App. 1, 103 S.W. 135 (K-C. Ct. App. 1907).
51. Id. at 8, 103 S.W. at 137.
52. Id. at 9, 103 S.W. at 137.
53. Id. at 9-10, 103 S.W. at 137.
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justness of governmental immunity could not have remained as a guide for future
judicial interpretations. But in 1912, in Cassidy v. City of St. Joseph.,5 the court
took the fire out of the Young opinion:
We think this distinction [Young v. Metropolitan St. Ry.] is too nar-
row and technical to constitute a reliable rule of action, even if the assump-
tion which it involves, that when one of the. objects of the work is to
keep the street in safe condition for travel the same municipality liability
results from the negligence of the officers and servants of the city who do
it as would result from leaving it undone, is correct. This, however, we do
not feel called upon to decide. The case, in so far as it may conflict with
this opinion, is disapproved.5 5
In the Cassidy case, an employee of the city was killed due to the negligence of a
fellow employee who had left a horse and wagon unhitched in violation of a city
ordinance. The court, in upholding the non-liability of the city, set forth a rule
of law which has since become the classic standard for similar cases:
The patrol wagon and its driver, the city ambulance with its driver, the
street sweepers with the vehicles, and employees that gather the dirt,
are all agencies of the government with respect to these matters as well
as the mayor and council who provide the rules that set them in mo-
tion. . . . Each actor in the drama of government is responsible only for
his own conduct."8
Although Cassidy established in clear language the rule to be followed, the
courts later compounded the confusion by deciding in cases of a similar nature
that the city was acting in its ministerial or proprietary capacity. In Stifel v.
City of St. Louis,67 the court held that the city was liable when it failed properly
to install and maintain a city fire plug, even though the plug was used for its
governmental function of sprinkling and flushing the streets in addition to its
other uses. Relying heavily upon Stifel, the court in DeMayo v. Kansas City,5s
held the city liable for the damage to property resulting from the failure of city
employees to turn off the water properly and securely after they had finished
flushing the streets.
However, in Lober v. Kansas City,59 the court reverted to the principles
established in the Cassidy case and expressly disapproved DeMayo. Finding the
negligent act of the city street cleaner in breaking a water hydrant and conse-
quently causing the flooding of a business establishment to be of governmental
basis, the court stated that:
It seems to us, however, that the flushing of the streets with water
by the street cleaning department of the city government appertains and is
primarily referable to the city's power and duty to care for and preserve
54. 247 Mo. 197, 152 S.W. 306 (1912).
55. Id. at 209, 152 S.W. at 310.
56. Id. at 207, 152 S.W. at 310. See also, Behrmann v. City of St. Louis, 273
Mo. 578, 201 S.W. 547 (1918).
57. 181 S.W. 577 (Mo. 1915).
58. 210 S.W. 380 (Mo. 1919).
59. 74 S.W.2d 815 (Mo. 1934).
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the health and safety of the inhabitants of the city, which is governmental,
rather than to its duty to keep the streets in a safe and suitable condi-
tion for use and travel.60
The reasoning of Cassidy and Lober was reaffirmed in Hayes v. City of Kansas
City,,1 wherein the court stated that:
[T]he rule in this state is firmly established that the keeping of streets
clean and free from filth and noxious refuse is a governmental function
and a city is free from liability in connection therewith.62
It is apparent from the cases discussed that the artificial and unsound distinc-
tions of the Missouri courts in separating street cleaning functions as governmental
in some cases and ministerial in others, have created irreconcilable rules which
tend to aggravate the principle of equality of treatment for all persons so injured.
In the era of the motor vehicle and its natural utilization by the municipalities in
its street cleaning departments, allowing the use of such vehicles upon city streets
without city liability for its employees' negligence, even under the guise of munici-
pal betterance, can, and often does, lead to injustice.
VI. NUIsANcEs
The unsupportable foundation of the municipal immunity theory is amply
illustrated by the confusion resulting from the courts' trying to apply the fiction
of functional classification in regard to nuisances. The Missouri cases on the sub-
ject are in conflict on whether or not to grant immunity to the municipal corpora-
tion for permitting, creating or maintaining a nuisance which results in injury to
persons or property. The more recent cases show a tendency to rule against the
traditional doctrine of non-liability and instead to apply the same degree of liabil-
ity to the municipality as would be applied to a private corporation under similar
circumstances.63
If the municipality did not create the conditions of the nuisance, then it is
generally held that there can be no recovery for the city's failure to exercise its
so called discretionary powers to abate the nuisance. To illustrate, in Armstrong v.
City of Brunswick, the city, even though it had notice of the activity, permitted
the building of hog pens for one hundred hogs next to plaintiff's hotel. This did
not in the court's opinion violate a city ordinance providing that the city was re-
quired "to abate, prevent and remove nuisances."- The court felt that the power
60. Id. at 821.
61. 362 Mo. 368, 241 S.W.2d 888 (1951), concerning an action for personal
injuries resulting from the negligence of a driver of a street cleaning truck that
was picking up a load of dirt, ashes, cans, and garbage.
62. Id. at 371, 241 S.W.2d at 890.
63. Torpey v. City of Independence, 24 Mo. App. 288 (K.C. Ct. App. 1887).
See also, Brown v. Scruggs, 141 Mo. App. 632, 634, 125 S.W. 537, 538 (K.C. Ct.
App. 1910): "[A] municipal corporation has no more right to erect and maintain a
nuisance on its own land than a private individual would have to maintain such a
nuisance on his land."
64. 79 Mo. 319, 320 (1883).
19621
14
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 2 [1962], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol27/iss2/4
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
under the ordinance was conferred for the public good and not for private corporate
advantage. In Kiley v. Kansas City,'" the city was granted immunity for the death
of a child, which resulted from the collapse of a burned out building standing up-
on private property, but adjacent with the street. Although the building constituted
a nuisance, the court did not feel that the city was bound to see that all of their
laws were enforced, though it had the power to do so and notice of the situation.
On the basis of these early cases, the Missouri courts have absolved the city
for failing to abate the keeping of an excessive amount of explosives on hand by a
city contractor which resulted in damages to an adjacent landowner,86 and for
permitting a street carnival with a shooting gallery which resulted in the loss of
an eye to a boy walking by.7 After this tragedy the city closed the gallery down;
however, the court frankly admitted that even if the officers of the city failed to
abate a nuisance, the city still could not be held liable for failing to exercise its
public functions.
In direct contrast to the cases previously mentioned the courts on certain occa-
sions have denied immunity to the municipality in failing to abate nuisances,
which points out the conflict in municipal tort precedent. In Roth v. City of St.
Jo.reph, the court found the city liable for failure to abate a nuisance created on a
public street by a railroad company in constructing an improperly drained em-
bankment. The court remarked that in such a case "it was the duty of the city to
abate the nuisance within a reasonable time after the reception of knowledge of its
existence and in failing so to do it became liable for the injurious consequences.
... "s In Swentzel v. Holmes, while ruling upon a suit between two private parties
concerning the collapse of a shared party wall and their liability to a third party,
the court by way of dictum stated that "the municipality under such circumstances
would also be liable to third persons on account of its passive negligence in failing
to abate the nuisance .... 6
On the other hand, when the city creates or maintains a nuisance of its own,
whether temporary or permanent, it is generally held liable to the same extent as a
private corporation. This liability is imposed regardless of whether the nuisance is
created or maintained in the performance of a governmental or proprietary ca-
pacity.
Most of the Missouri cases on the subject' are in accord with this general rule.
In Ftick v. Kasas City,"7 the court found the city liable for the nuisance created
'by the digging of a sewer which, due to the negligence involved, increased the
65. 87 Mo. 103 (1885).
66. Holman v. Clark, 272 Mo. 266, 198 S.W. 868 (1917).
67. Trower v. City of Louisiana, 198 Mo. App. 352, 200 S.W. 763 (St. L. Ct.
App. 1918).
68. Roth v. City of St. Joseph, 164 Mo. App. 26, 30, 147 S.W. 490, 491 (K.C.
Ct. App. 1912).
69. Swentzel v. Holmes, 175 S.W. 871, 875 (Mo. 1915).
70. 117 Mo. App. 488, 93 S.W. 351 (K.C. Ct. App. 1906); other cases dealing
with the city creating a surface water nuisance: Roth v. City of St. Joseph, sraira
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amount of surface water on the adjoining land. In State ex. rel. Lammr. v. City of
Sedalia,71 the court held the city liable for leaving dead animals scattered around
for three days prior to burying them. The court commented:
Under the circumstances of this case there is no more reason why a city
cannot be enjoined for creating a public nuisance than any corporation or
person.... And when under the circumstances herein set out it creates a
public nuisance it can be dealt with the same as any individual, for "there
is no law declaring municipal corporations infallible or that their demands
are incontestable."72
Following this realistic and liberal attitude, the courts have held the municipal
corporation liable in the following situations: the creation of a back-water pond
even though the pond was on private property;73 for property damages resulting
from the extension of a sewer without authority of an ordinance;74 the creation of
a nuisance resulting from the city's garbage disposal;75 the maintaining of a septic
tank which emitted unbearable odors76 and the discharging of a city sewer into a
riparian land owner's stream.77
These cases would seem to preclude any opinion to the contrary, but a few
earlier cases have gone down a different track. In Martinowsky v. City of Hanni-
-bal,78 the court felt that the city had no control over nuisances, even though the
city and others were dumping obnoxious material into a stream flowing past plain-
tiff's property. In Whitfield v. Town of Carrollton,79 the court held that the erec-
tion by the city's agents of a large water standpipe next to a residence was not a
nuisance. The court noted that "people living in cities and large towns must sub-
mit to some inconveniences, to some annoyance, to some discomforts and to some
injury." The court has also denied liability for damages created by an unauthorized
city tourist court and sewer discharge, on the ground the city is not liable for
nuisances arising from its dtra vires acts.80
VII. OTHER GOVERNMENTAL FuNcniONS
Of all the functions performed by municipalities, the power of taxationsi and
the failure to enact an ordinance are undisputably classified as governmental and
71. 241 S.W. 656 (K.C. Ct. App. 1922).
72. Id. at 658.
73. Davon v. Kansas City, 308 Mo. 513, 273 S.W. 401 (1925).
74. Windle v. City of Springfield, 320 Mo. 459, 8 S.W.2d 61 (1928).
75. State ex rel. Hog Haven Farms v. Pearch, 328 Mo. 560, 41 S.W.2d 403
(1931).
76. Newman v. City of Marceline, 222 Mo. App. 980, 6 S.W.2d 659 (K.C. Ct.
App. 1928).
77. Stewart v. City of Springfield, 350 Mo. 234, 165 S.W.2d 626 (1942). See
also, Riggs v. City of Springfield, 96 S.W.2d 392 (Spr. Ct. App. 1936), rev'd on
other grounds, 126 S.W.2d 1144.
78. 35 Mo. App. 70 (St. L. Ct. App. 1889).
79. 50 Mo. App. 98, 105 (K.C. Ct. App. 1892).
80. Kennedy v. City of Nevada, 222 Mo. App. 459, 281 S.W. 56 (K.C. Ct.
App. 1926).
81. Simons Hardware Co. v. City of St. 'Louis, 192 S.W. 394 (Mo. 1916).
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consequently the immunity theory follows. Moore v. City of Cape Girardeau,8 2
laid down the general proposition that in the area of legislating the municipality
closely resembles the state legislature, and therefore the city is not liable for failure
to exercise its discretionary power to enact ordinances.
The enforcement of ordinances is also granted the halo of immunity from all
tort actions. The rationale of this rule is that enforcement is executive in nature
and therefore it carries the same immunity as that of the legislative function.. The
Missouri courts have upheld the immunity when the city fails to enforce its ordi-
nances requiring the filling of holes and depressions,83 the fencing of excavations,'
the non-erection of wooden buildings in certain zoned areas,8 5 the removal of dead
animals from the streets within six hours, 86 the erection of barriers and placing of
lights around street excavations, s7 the issuance of a license to qualify for blast-
ing, 8 and the providing of temporary walkways for persons passing around a side-
walk obstruction19 The immunity theory in these cases is approved where the
city, in using reasonable care and judgment, is unaware of the violation committed.
But where the city is aware of the defect or violation"0 it should be liable for its
failure to enforce such ordinances in the same manner as it is held in its failure to
abate a nuisance.
The courts have classified as governmental the act of refusing a building per-
mit even where the refusal was based upon an invalid ordinance. 91 By the same
reasoning a city is not liable in damages for its wrongful refusal to issue a peddler's
license,0 2 the neglect of the city treasurer to issue a certificate to a purchaser of
property, 3 or the failure to reinstate a former employee who had fulfilled his serv-
ice obligation and had returned to claim his former job as provided for by
statute.0 4
The negligent and careless acts of officers, agents, and servants of schools and
school districts have been held, without exception by the courts in Missouri, to be
free of pecuniary motive and therefore the city is devoid of responsibility for torts
in this area. 0
82. 103 Mo. 470, 15 S.W. 755 (1897).
83. Moran v. Pullman Palace Car Co., 134 Mo. 641, 36 S.W. 659 (1896).
84. Butz v. Cavanaugh, 137 Mo. 503, 38 S.W. 1104 (1897).
85. Harmon v. City of St. Louis, 137 Mo. 494, 38 S.W. 1102 (1897).
86. Sallee v. City of St. Louis, 152 Mo. 615, 54 S.W. 463 (1899).
87. Ryan v. Kansas City, 232 Mo. 471, 134 S.W. 566 (1911). See also, Bean
v. City of Moberly, 350 Mo. 975, 169 S.W.2d 393 (1943).
88. Salmon v. Kansas City, 241 Mo. 14, 145 S.W. 16 (1912).
89. Strother v. Kansas City, 316 Mo. 1067, 296 S.W. 795 (1927) (en banc).
90. Ibid.; Sallee v. City of St. Louis, supra note 86; Harmon v. City. of St.
Louis, supra note 85; Moran v. Pullman Palace Car Co., supra note 83.
91. Kramer v. City of Jefferson, 124 S.W.2d 525 (K.C. Ct. App. 1939).
92. Butler v. City of Moberly, 131 Mo. App. 172, 110 S.W. 682 (K.C. Ct.
App. 1908).
93. Brightwell v. Kansas City, 153 Mo. App. 519, 134 S.W. 87 (K.C. Ct. App.
1911).
94. Feuchter v. City of St. Louis, 210 S.W.2d 21 (1948).
95. Johnson v. Independent School Dist., 199 S.W.2d 421 (Spr. Ct. App.
1947); Krueger v. Board of Educ. of St. Louis, 310 Mo. 239, 274 S.W. 811 (1925);
McClure Bros. v. School Dist. of Tipton, 79 Mo. App. 80 (K.C. Ct. App. 1889)..
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Also within the privileged position of governmental immunity is the opera-
tion of animal pounds in a negligent and malicious manner, 96 the failure to barri-
cade an open pit in a court house building,9 7 the negligent maintenance of a safety
gate at a public railroad crossing,98 the maintaining of "good order" at a public
park,9 9 and the neglect of duty in adopting plans for public improvements. 10
CONCLUSION
Although much has been said for the abrogation of municipal tort immunity
since Rwssel,1 9' the vast majority of the courts, Missouri's included, continue to fol-
low strictly precedents which would seem to have long ago lost their usefulness. The
few outcries against immunity have been smothered by the oft-repeated statements
"that it is up to the Legislature to make the change" or that "the doctrine of
stare decisis compels us to do otherwise."
To accept these arguments would be to admit that the doctrine of stare
decisis is an inflexible standard to which strict adherence must be given. At one
time, municipal immunity may have had reason for existence, but those times have
passed and the judges of the present day should be able to mold their decisions to
meet the present day needs and demands. As eloquently stated by Justice Wheeler,
of the Connecticut Supreme Court:
That court best serves the law which recognizes that the rules of law
which grew up in a remote generation may in the fullness of experience be
found to serve another generation badly, and which discards the old rule
when it finds that another rule of law represents what should be according
to the established and settled judgment of society, and no considerable
property rights have become vested in reliance upon the old rule. It is thus
great writers upon the common law have discovered the source and meth-
od of its growth, and in its growth is found its health and life. It is not
and it should not be stationary. Changes of this character should not be
left to the Legislature.O2
Therefore, the courts of Missouri in giving birth to the doctrine of municipal
immunity should not defer their responsibility for the eradication of this legacy
of injustice.103 No one questioned the power of the courts to close their doors to
96. Thomas v. City of Kennet, 178 S.W. 254 (St. L. Ct. App. 1915); Wilks v.
City of Caruthersville, 462 Mo. App. 492, 142 S.W. 800 (St. 'L. Ct. App. 1912).
97. Cunningham v. City of St. Louis, 96 Mo. 53, 8 S.W. 787 (1888).
98. Seibert v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 188 Mo. 657, 87 S.W. 995 (1905).
99. Healy v. Kansas City, 277 Mo. 619, 211 S.W. 59 (1919).
100. Ely v. City of St. Louis, 181 Mo. 723, 81 S.W. 168 (1904); Koesman v.
City of St. Louis, 153 Mo. 293, 54 S.W. 513 (1899); Keating v. Kansas City, 84
Mo. 415 (1884); Bassit v. City of St. Joseph, 53 Mo. 290 (1873); Woods v. Kansas
City, 58 Mo. App. 272 (K.C. Ct. App. 1894).
101. Russel v. Men Residing in the County of Devon, 2 Term Rep. 667, 100
Eng. Rep. 359 (1778).
102. Dwy v. Connecticut Co., 89 Conn. 74, 99, 92 Atl. 883, 891 (1914).
103. See dissenting opinion of Birch, J., in City of St. Louis v. Gurno, 12 Mo.
414, 426 (1849), wherein he stated that "as to the impolicy, therefore, of subjecting
corporations to suits of this character, if it were even an open judicial question, no
sufficient reason occurred why a citizen who may sue his neighbor, should be re-
strained from similarly suing 6 or 7,000 (incorporated) for an injury . .. ."
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